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Individual Party Donors: True Allies or Free Agents?

Dr. Anne E. Baker
Santa Clara University
500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA 95053-1500
aebaker@scu.edu
Habitual party donors represent an important revenue source for American political parties
(Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell, and Wilcox 2003). What remains unclear is whether the party
committees can also count on these donors to support the congressional candidates who represent
the parties’ best chances for seat maximization. Utilizing structural equation modeling and
contribution data from the 2006 to the 2012 election cycles, I find habitual party donors and
certain new party donors respond to changes in party control of the House by providing more
support to incumbents when their party is in the majority and more support to non-incumbents
when their party is in the minority. Moreover, party donors are more likely to give to
congressional candidates, especially those competing in priority races, than non-party donors.
Party donors additionally are revealed to be an important funding source for congressional
candidates.
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Over the course of their modern history, American party organizations have sought to
build long-term relationships with their habitual donors using a wide variety of fundraising
programs and tactics (Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell, and Wilcox, 2003; Herrnson, 2012).
Each party has its own donor pool of regular contributors. In 2012, the Republican Party
committees could claim 191,372 of these donors and Democratic Party committees could rely
upon 118,041 of these donors as a fundraising base. Without a doubt, these donors are vital to the
ongoing mission, financial solvency, and subsequent electoral influence of the parties’ national,
senatorial, and congressional campaign committees. Despite the central role of parties in the
distribution of resources in U.S. elections, very little research assesses the consistency with
which this important set of party donors contributes to both the party committees and the party’s
candidates in ways that best serve the party’s interests (La Raja, 2013). In short, the loyalty of
party donors and the degree to which the extra-party contribution decisions of these donors align
with party interests is not well understood (La Raja, 2013; Francia et. al., 2003).
This study examines the contribution decisions of first-time and habitual party donors to
determine whether each set of donors is more or less likely to support the party’s efforts to gain
and retain seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. Structural equation modeling (SEM) is
used to analyze the giving patterns of these two sets of donors in each party between 2006 and
2012. Two sets of midterm and presidential election years are compared 2006/2008 and
2010/2012 because party control changed in the House during each set of these years. The
Democrats gained a majority of seats in the 2006 election and held onto that majority until the
2010 election when the Republicans were able to reclaim majority status. Comparisons of these
time periods are used to determine whether contribution patterns change in ways that reflect
changes in party control in the House. The primary goal is to determine whether party donors
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provide more contributions to experienced non-incumbent candidates when their party is in the
minority in the House and seeks to expand the number of seats it holds and whether contributions
to vulnerable incumbents are more likely when the party holds the majority of seats in the House
but seeks to protect those seats.
I find Democratic habitual donors engaged in seat maximizing giving in 2006, 2008, and
2012 and Republican habitual donors did so in 2006, 2010 and 2012. First-time donors were
more likely to target competitive races in their second election cycle of contributing to House
races despite less consistent giving to targeted races in their first election cycle of giving.
Additionally, in a comparison of both sets of party donors to non-party donors, I find party
donors are more likely to make contributions to congressional candidates and their likelihood of
giving to specific subgroups of targeted candidates is much higher than it is for non-party donors.
Finally, an analysis of the impact of party donors’ targeted giving to House candidates enables
me to demonstrate the importance of party donors for congressional campaign fundraising as
well as party seat maximization goals.

The relationship between parties and individual donors
Previous studies identify a number of donor attributes and behaviors, which could predict
the commitment of individual donors to the party’s goals. Most importantly, individual donors
are ideological partisans who hold policy opinions that are ideologically distinct from average
Americans (Francia et. al., 2003, 2005; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2006; Bramlett, Gimpel,
and Lee, 2011; Page, Bartels, and Seawright, 2013). This attribute ties many donors to one party
or the other. In fact, the vast number of individual donors give money to one only party. Between
2006 and 2012, 1,074,372 donors gave to either the Democratic or Republican Party committees
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whereas 3,447 donors gave to both parties. Clearly this later set of donors is more the exception
than the rule. In Franica et. al.’s (2005) survey of the congressional donor pool in the 1996
election, ideologically-oriented donors fully make-up one third of the donor pool. Although their
study reveals diverse motives drive donors, importantly, their results indicate the most
ideological donors tend to contribute most frequently both within and across election cycles and
they are more likely to contribute to interest groups as well as parties and candidates who support
their ideological views (Francia et. al., 2003, 2005). The results of other studies showing
ideological candidates enjoy greater fundraising success from individual donors (Gimpel, Lee,
and Perason-Merkowitz, 2008; Johnson, 2010) and those suggesting candidates may position
themselves to attract the donations of ideological donors (Ensley, 2009; Moon, 2004) provide
further evidence of the ideological bent of the donor pool. Given the prevalence of ideological
donors in the congressional donor pool and the overall tendency of donors to contribute to a
single party, it is likely party donors will be attentive to party goals at least some of the time.
Parties cultivate their donor pools over time by developing donor lists, which are
expanded and maintained through the use of direct mail, special events, and targeted fundraising
membership programs (Grant and Rudolph, 2002; La Raja, 2008; Herrnson, 2012). Further
additions are made to the lists by campaigns sharing their own donor lists with the party
(Herrnson, 1998; Cain, 2012; Dominguez, 2005). Party donors are also cultivated indirectly by
party fundraisers who are recruited for their connections to existing elite networks which they
leverage to bundle contributions for both the party and its candidates (Grant and Rudolph, 2002;
Brown, Powell, and Wilcox, 1995; Birnbaum, 2000; Gimpel, Lee, Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008).
There is also overlap between consulting firms under contract with the party committees and
many House campaigns, which engage in fundraising for both sets of clients (Cain, 2012;
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Herrnson, 1992). Cain (2012) demonstrates House campaigns that hire party-connected
consultants raise a larger percentage of funds from outside of their districts. Cain (2012) argues
this is due to the firms’ connections to the party’s network of national donors. In sum, party
officials, party activists, and party-connected consultants all solicit funds from party donors on
the behalf of candidate campaigns and the party. They lower information costs for donors by
matching donors with like-minded candidates and by extensively tracking the competitiveness of
congressional races in order to target resources toward the races which present the greatest
opportunities for gaining seats and those where resources are needed to protect existing seats
(Gimpel, Lee, Peason-Merkowitz, 2008; Herrnson, 2012). Thus, party donors are likely to be
informed about the party’s goals and be able to contribute in ways that align with those goals if
so desired.
Given the preponderance of donors contributing to a single party, evidence from studies
suggesting party donors are ideological, and the sophistication with which previous studies
demonstrate parties interface with donors to lower their information costs by apprising them of
races that are party priorities, there is good reason to believe donors might be attentive to party
seat-maximization goals when they choose to make contributions to congressional candidates.
Previous studies suggest habitual party donors are much more likely to be seasoned party
activists with multiple interest group affiliations and a higher propensity than occasional donors
to volunteer on campaigns (Francia et. al., 2003, 2005). Their ties to the party are likely stronger
than those of first-time donors. Giving patterns for both habitual and first-time contributors are
hypothesized to reflect changes in party control in the House with the likelihood of party donors
giving to experienced challengers and open-seat candidates rising when their party is in the
minority and the likelihood of vulnerable incumbent support rising when their party is in the
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majority. The magnitude of the party control effect should be higher for habitual contributors
than first-time contributors.

Data and methods
Using structural equation modeling (SEM), I test the extent to which party donors
provide funds to targeted races that could help their party gain more seats or to protect their seat
margins in the House as opposed to contributing funds to interest groups which may or may not
serve party interests. SEM is used to examine the impact of exogenous variables on endogenous
variables and the effect of different endogenous variables on one another using path analysis. In
this instance, SEM models the relationships among individuals’ contributions to parties,
candidates, and interest groups as “a whole process of a series of nested dependent variables,
modeling direct and indirect effects, with multiple dependent variables” (Price and Collet, 2012:
13; Bollen, 1989). This feature makes it possible to control for prior giving while factoring
multicollinear effects between endogenous variables and error variances into the model. The
ability to interpret these endogenous effects counts as an advantage here because the goal is to
determine whether party donors are directing funds to promising non-incumbents and to protect
incumbents. Since by law donors can only contribute up to the global maximums during the time
period of this study (discussed below), their contribution decisions are partly dependent upon
how many candidates fall into each of these two categories and how attractive those candidates
are relative to one another—as a consequence, the error variances are correlated in the models.
Paths are also included to represent the effect each type of giving has on other types of giving. In
SEM, the goal is for the researcher to find the best model to fit the data—in this regard it is a
confirmatory rather than exploratory approach (Golob 2003). I use Stata’s program for structural

6

equation models using the maximum likelihood method of estimation for all of the models that
appear below. Robust standard errors are utilized to account for some heteroskedasticity in the
error variances.
All contribution data are gleaned from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and
Elections (DIME) (Bonica, 2013). The portion of the dataset used in this study includes all
individual contributions that were reported to the U.S. Federal Election Commission between
2004 and 2012. The dataset represents a major improvement upon using the FEC’s data directly
because the “names, addresses, and occupation and employer titles [of the individual donors]
have been cleaned and standardized” and “entity resolution techniques were used to assign
unique identifiers” to all donors in the database (Bonica, 2013). The cleaned dataset makes it
possible to reliably calculate the total contributions made by each individual donor in the dataset
to the various party committees, different candidate campaigns, and to interest groups.
Individual donors are divided into Democratic and Republican camps on the basis of
whether the donor made a direct contribution to at least one of the parties’ national committees
(presidential, senatorial, or congressional) between 2004 and 2012. The 3,447 donors who made
contributions to both parties between 2004 and 2012 are not included in the party donor analysis.
The total amounts each donor contributed to the party committees (Pty), interest groups (IG),
vulnerable incumbents (Vulnerable), and experienced challengers and open-seat contestants
(Experienced) are included as the other variables in the model. Reported hard dollar
contributions are $200 and greater. Individual donors are limited by campaign finance law in
terms of not only how much money they can contribute directly to candidates, parties, and
interest groups as individual entities1 but also by how much they can give in total over the course
of the election cycle to all three of these entities. The global contribution limit in 2006, the lower
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bound of this dataset, was $95,000, and the cap for 2012, the upper bound of this dataset, was
$117,000 per two-year cycle.2 The total contributions made to the party by first-time party
donors and habitual party donors are tabulated separately for each election cycle. A donor is
classified as habitual after making at least one contribution to at least one of the party
committees in at least two different election cycles between 2004 and 2012. The 2004 data are
utilized to identify habitual donors in 2006 but are not part of the SEM analysis.
Interest group contribution totals include all direct contributions reported to the U.S.
Federal Election Commission. This means only contributions to non-connected and connected
political action committees (PACs) and reporting Super PACs are included in the analysis.
Contributions to 501c interest groups are not included because those contributions are reported to
the Internal Revenue Service rather than the FEC and are not typically itemized. I categorized
non-incumbents as experienced prior to generating total amounts given by each individual party
donor to these candidates using a dummy indicating whether the non-incumbent candidate has
previously held elected office or not. I also categorized incumbents as vulnerable or not based
upon Congressional Quarterly’s (CQ) classification of House races in October of each election
year prior to calculating the total contributions to vulnerable incumbents made by each
individual party donor.
These variables make-up the models displayed in Figures 1-10 in the online Appendix
and the corresponding tables highlighting specific effects within time periods and specific
pathways from those models (see Tables 1-4). Since a primary goal of SEM analyses is to find
the best fitting model, the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual term is used to asses fit. The
SRMR is “standardized difference between the observed correlation and the predicted
correlation” (Kenny, 2016). The benchmark for the SRMR is 0.08 (Hu and Bentler, 1998).
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Scores of less than 0.08 are considered a good fit and an as the score approaches zero the
predictive fit of the model to the data nears a perfect fit. I also include the coefficient of
determination to provide a sense of the model’s overall coverage of variance.

Contribution patterns by party and period
The results of the SEM analysis are displayed in Figures 1-10 in the on-line Appendix.
Tables 1 and 2 provide the goodness of fit statistics for each model, the direct effects of party
contributions on contributions to specific House races and interest groups, and the total effects of
giving in the previous election cycle on all forms of giving in the following election cycle. The
SRMR of the 2006-2008 models is 0.022 for both sets of Republican donors and 0.041 for both
sets of Democratic donors. In the 2010-2012 models it is 0.27 for Democratic first -time donors
and 0.054 for Democratic habitual donors and 0.024 for Republican first-time donors and 0.012
for Republican habitual donors. All of the SRMR values are well below the 0.08 benchmark.
This suggests the fit of all eight models in Tables 1 and 2 is excellent. A glance at Figures 1-10
reveals the same model was utilized for all subsets of the data.
As hypothesized, the period effects reflect donors’ responsiveness to party control of the
House. At the outset of the 2006 midterm election, Republicans held control of a majority of
seats in the House. In this election cycle both first-time and habitual Democratic donors were
more likely to contribute to experienced non-incumbents (!= 0.037 for first-time donors and !=
0.065 for habitual donors, see Table 1). By the 2008 election, the Democrats held a majority of
seats in the House. In this election cycle, the likelihood of support slightly declined for
experienced non-incumbents and increased for vulnerable incumbents (!= 0.012 for first-time
donors and != 0.01 for habitual donors, see Table 1). Although first-time donors appear to
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exhibit the same degree of support for vulnerable incumbents as experienced non-incumbents
(!= 0.012 in Table 1), the significance of the pathway between party support and support of
vulnerable incumbents in 2008 is higher, suggesting they gave more consistently to vulnerable
incumbents than experienced non-incumbents. Mirroring these trends, both sets of Republican
donors were more likely to contribute to vulnerable incumbents in 2006 election when their party
was at risk of losing its majority in the House (!= 0.065 for first-time donors and != 0.076 for
habitual donors, see Table 1). However, in 2008, neither first-time Republican donors nor
habitual donors gave in ways that strategically supported the minority party’s goals to expand
seat margins after losing control of the House in 2006. Habitual Republican donors are almost
equally likely to give to experienced non-incumbent candidates (!= 0.009) as vulnerable
incumbents in 2008 (!= 0.015). Similarly, first-time Republican donors in 2008 also commit
comparable levels of support to both targeted non-incumbents (!= 0.007) as vulnerable
incumbents (!= 0.013).
The predicted giving patterns in 2010 and 2012 election cycles also reflect degrees of
responsiveness to changes in party control. The Democrats maintained a majority in the House in
the 2008 presidential election but lost control of a majority of seats in the 2010 midterm election.
Conversely Republicans were on the offensive in the 2010 election hoping to expand their seat
margins. In keeping with this goal, habitual Republican donors are more likely to provide
support to experienced non-incumbent candidates (!= 0.087 in Table 2) than vulnerable
incumbents in 2010 (!= 0.006). However, both sets of Democratic donors appear unresponsive
to seat margins of control in 2010. In fact, first-time donors in both parties have negative
coefficients for the direct effects of party giving on candidate support in 2010 indicating their
party contributions decreased their likelihood of giving to congressional candidates. In 2012,
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however, more consistent giving patterns emerge. Habitual Republican donors are more likely to
contribute to vulnerable incumbents (!= 0.088) than experienced non-incumbents (!= 0.010)
when their party holds a majority in the House. First-time Republican donors’ giving patterns in
this instance mirror those of Republican habitual donors with greater support given to vulnerable
incumbents in 2012 (!= 0.107). Habitual Democratic donors are more likely to contribute to
experienced non-incumbent candidates (!= 0.020) than vulnerable incumbents (!= 0.013) at a
time when their party sought to expand seat margins. However, first-time Democratic donors do
not exhibit similar support for party goals in 2012 (see insignificant direct effects in Table 2).
The direct effects above document patterns of giving within particular election cycles.
The total effects are now discussed to highlight giving patterns across election cycles that can
reveal important trends in the giving patterns of first-time donors. The degree to which first-time
donors become more likely to target their contributions to competitive races is reflected in the
total effects between the decision to contribute money to the party for the first-time and giving to
targeted races in the next election cycle (see total effects rows in Tables 1 and 2). Democratic
first-time donors in 2006 are slightly more likely to contribute to vulnerable incumbents than
experienced non-incumbents in 2008 when the party was protecting its seat margins in the House
(!= 0.026 versus != 0.024; see total effects in Table 1). Republican first-time donors from the
2006 election cycle are slightly more likely to contribute to vulnerable incumbents in 2008 as
well even though their party needed to expand its seats to regain the majority (!= 0.012
versus != 0.015; see Table 1). In the 2010-2012 election cycle, the total effects of giving in 2010
on giving to targeted races in 2012 show Democratic first-time donors in 2010 who became
habitual contributors in 2012 align their giving with party goals. They are more likely to
contribute to experienced non-incumbents in 2012 (!= 0.014 versus != 0.006; see Table 2).
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While their support of non-incumbent candidates (!= 0.014 in Table 2) was not equal in
magnitude to Democratic habitual donors (!= 0.031; see total effects in Table 2), their likelihood
of supporting priority races rose from insignificance to half the magnitude of the coefficient for
habitual donors (see Table 2). Similarly, the total effects of giving for first-time Republican
donors show in their second cycle of giving in 2012 they targeted their funds to vulnerable
Republican incumbents when their party held the majority (!= 0.037 in Table 2). Moreover, the
total effects of giving money to the party for the first-time in 2010 are slightly higher in
magnitude than the total effects uncovered for habitual Republican donors (! = 0.034 for giving
to vulnerable incumbents in 2012 in Table 2).
A final period-based effect that was not anticipated is the decline in both first-time and
habitual party donors’ likelihood of contributing to interest groups. The magnitude and in some
instances the significance of both the direct and total effects decrease for both first-time and
habitual Democratic and Republican donors between the 2006-2008 (see Table 1). The decline in
party donor’s interest group contributions between 2006 and 2008 is small in magnitude but
appears for all sets of donors. It may reflect the decline in giving to all groups that occurred as a
consequence of the 2008 economic downturn. In the 2010, there is a dramatic increase in the
direct effects contributions to the party have on the likelihood of contributing to interest groups
that is quickly followed by a dramatic decease in 2012 (see direct effects Table 2). The dramatic
increase in interest group giving in 2010 and similarly dramatic decrease observed in 2012 are
likely a consequence of changes in campaign finance laws and relatedly, that the interest group
totals included in these models are only for contributions that were reported to the U.S. Federal
Election Commission. The implications of this finding are discussed in more detail below.
Magnitude of effects: Comparison to non-party donors
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To gain a better sense of how consistently party donors contribute to the parties’ targeted
set of races, I compare the results discussed above to a second analysis featuring non-party
donors. The same time periods and the same models of the relationships between variables are
utilized. The analysis includes all non-party donors who contributed to reporting interest groups.
The goal is to determine whether contributing to interest groups makes it more likely for donors
to give to targeted House races than contributing to political parties does. The results are
presented in Tables 3 and 4. The SRMR scores are 0.033 in 2006/2008 and 0.047 in 2010/2012.
Both are well below 0.08 indicating the models fit the data very well.
The direct effects suggest giving to an interest group in 2006 does increase the donor’s
likelihood of giving to either experienced non-incumbents or vulnerable incumbents in 2006.
However, the magnitude of the effect (!= 0.013 for experienced non-incumbents and != 0.011
for vulnerable incumbents in Table 3) is smaller than the direct effects for each set of party
donors. In other words, party donors are more likely than non-party donors to give to targeted
races in 2006. In 2008, the differences are even more pronounced. Giving to interest groups does
not significantly influence giving to either set of candidates. In 2010, contributing to an interest
group does significantly increase the likelihood that the donor will give to an experienced nonincumbent (!= 0.006 in Table 4) but the magnitude of the effect is much smaller than the direct
effect of party giving among habitual Republican donors (see Table 2, != 0.087). Interest group
giving does not significantly predict giving to vulnerable incumbents in 2010. In 2012 interest
group contributions actually decrease the likelihood of giving to vulnerable incumbents and does
not significantly affect giving to experienced non-incumbents. In contrast, distinct giving
patterns are observed for party donors highlighting their responsiveness to party goals in both
election cycles (see Table 2). In short, party donors are more likely to give to congressional
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candidates in general than non-party donors and their giving patterns reflect support for the
parties’ electoral goals because the significance and magnitude of the coefficients on average
reflect changes in party control of the House from one election to the next.

Party donors’ responsiveness
Habitual party donors who chose to make contributions to House candidates between
2006 and 2012 gave in ways that support their parties’ seat maximization goals. These patterns
of giving were most pronounced in the 2006 and 2012 election cycles when habitual donors in
both parties directed support to targeted races. In 2006, Democratic habitual donors directed
funds to the parties’ experienced non-incumbent candidates reflecting the party’s need to expand
its seat margins to gain control of the House (see Table 1). Conversely, Republican habitual
donors channeled funds to protect vulnerable incumbents from defeat (see Table 1). In 2012,
when the tables had turned and the Republican held a majority in the House, Democratic habitual
donors once again gave in ways that would expand their party’s seat margins whereas
Republican habitual donors contributed to vulnerable incumbents.
First-time donors in both parties did not exhibit the same consistency in their giving
patterns as habitual donors. The magnitude of the coefficients for all candidate-related giving are
almost always larger for habitual donors than their first-time counterparts. Additionally, the 2010
and 2012 election cycles included negative or insignificant direct effects for party giving on
candidate giving for each set of first-time donors. Not only are they less likely to support their
party’s preferred set of races but also they are less likely to contribute to congressional
candidates in general. The summary statistics in Table 5 show the number of first-time donors in
each party who contributed to candidates competing in targeted congressional races in each
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election cycle. At most the number of first-time donors who contribute to targeted candidates
only once rises to half the number of habitual donors who contribute to congressional candidates
(see Table 5). Generally, the ratio of first-time donors to habitual donors giving to congressional
candidates is much smaller. That said, today’s first-time donors can become tomorrow’s habitual
donors. By their second cycle of giving, there were observable improvements in first-time
Democratic donors’ likelihood of supporting party priority races in 2008 and 2012 and first-time
Republican donors’ likelihood of targeted support in the 2012 election cycle (see total effects
Tables 1 and 2).
Even though important differences are revealed in the consistency of each set of party’s
donors giving patterns, both sets of donors in each party are far more likely than non-party
donors to make contributions to congressional candidates. Party donors’ likelihood of supporting
particular subgroups of candidates, either vulnerable incumbents or experienced non-incumbents,
greatly exceeded the likelihood of supporting those candidates by non-party donors. In fact,
pathways for non-party donors’ likelihood of contributing to congressional candidates are only
highly significant and positively signed in 2006, are insignificant in 2008, are barely significant
only for experienced non-incumbents in 2010, and become negative or conversely insignificant
in 2012 (see Tables 3 and 4).
While habitual party donors and new party donors who give a second time exhibit
distinctive giving patterns reflecting party seat maximization goals, the descriptive statistics in
Table 5 also show that only a portion of the parties’ donor pools choose to make contributions to
House candidates. The last row for each party in Table 5 lists the number of party donors who
gave to at least one of the party committees but chose not to give to any House candidates in
each corresponding election cycle. The total number of donors in each party who confined their
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giving to one or more of the party committees and did not contribute to any House candidates
between 2006 and 2012 is 241,529 in the Democratic donor pool and 598,432 in the Republican
donor pool. Part of the reason the number of donors who chose not to give money to any House
candidates is higher for the Republicans is that in 2008, 365,425 contributors made one-time
contributions to at least one of the Republican party committees—among these one time
contributors, 349,983 did not make contributions to any House candidates. Although these
numbers appear to undermine the results presented previously by revealing that the prevailing
tendency of party donors is not to give to House candidates, the impact of the party donors who
do give to House candidates merits further attention before any conclusions can be drawn about
their importance.
Table 6 shows the number of House candidates who received any degree of financial
support from party donors in each election cycle. Between 2006 and 2012, more than a two
thousand House candidates from both parties, and roughly a 1,000 or more in each party,
received support in each election cycle. Clearly, many congressional candidates benefit from the
higher propensity of certain party donors to contribute to their campaigns. The next column in
Table 6 shows the average amount of total support received by individual House candidates from
all respective party donors. The average amount of total support collectively given by
Republican party donors to particular candidates competing in House races varies from a little as
$98,498 in 2008 to as much as $141,740 in 2012 and for Democratic donors it varies from
$103,238 in 2006 to a high of $137,090 in 2012 (see Table 6).
For targeted races, the average total amounts of support tend to be much higher.
Experienced challengers total average campaign fundraising receipts ranged between $803,136
in 2006 and $1.1 million in 2012. For this set of candidates, contributions from party donors can
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represent over 15 percent or more of total fundraising receipts on average. For example, in 2010
when Republicans were trying to expand their seat margins in the House, the average in the total
support provided by Republican Party donors rose to $197,407 with a median of $41,800 for
experienced challengers (see Table 6). That year experienced challengers in both parties were
able to raise an average of $1,157,773 from all fundraising sources. Thus, support from party
donors for an average challenger in this subset of candidates constituted over 17 percent of all
receipts. In 2012, Democratic experienced challengers received an average total of $208,633
(Table 6) with a median of $16,100 collectively from Democratic Party donors. The average
amount of money raised by experienced challengers in 2012 was $1,106,300. The proportion of
fundraising from Democratic Party donors amounted to 19 percent of all receipts for experienced
challengers.
For vulnerable incumbents and experienced open-seat candidates, party donors also
represent an important revenue source. Vulnerable incumbents’ average total receipts range from
$2.7 million in 2006 to $2.4 million in 2012 and experienced open seat contestants’ total receipt
averages range from $1.4 million in 2006 to $1.3 million in 2012. For vulnerable incumbents,
total contributions from party donors amount to 13 percent or more of all receipts on average. In
2010, while the Republicans were busy trying to expand their seat margins, Democrats moved to
protect their incumbents. In that election cycle, the average total support Democratic Party
donors extended to individual vulnerable incumbents was $535,245 with a median of $339,393
(see Table 6). Vulnerable incumbents raised an average of $2,510,894 in 2010 (with a median of
$ 2,440,685). Thus, Democratic Party donors’ support constituted more than twenty percent of
all fundraising receipts for an average vulnerable incumbent in 2010. This was the highest
proportion of average total receipts made up by party donors of either party in any of the four
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election cycles. For experienced open seat candidates support from party donors ranges between
11 percent and 21 percent of total average fundraising receipts. In 2008, when Democrats sought
to hold onto their majority, Democratic donors gave the most contributions to vulnerable
incumbents but also to experienced open seat candidates (see Table 6). On average contributions
from Democratic Party donors totaled $365,926 per experienced Democratic open seat candidate
(see Table 6) amounting to 21 percent of all receipts for the average experienced open seat
candidate. Since open seat races are the most competitive and as a consequence gain the most
funding from all sources, the fact that party donors collectively can provide an average of 15
percent of the funds raised by these candidates is all the more impressive. The analysis of the
descriptive statistics and count data in Tables 5 and 6 show that party donors play a major role in
congressional campaign fundraising and relatedly the likelihood the party will gain and retain
seats of strategic importance.
Candidates also may be able to count on greater support from party donors in the future.
The number of Democratic donors who contribute to congressional candidates is increasing
overtime among all subsets of donors (see Table 5). The number of Democratic habitual donors
who also contributed to House candidates competing in races across the country rose from
25,660 in 2006 to 40,327 in 2012 and the number of first-time Democratic donors who did the
same rose from 8,019 in 2006 to 15,375 in 2012 (see Table 5). Whereas the number of
Republican Party donors who contribute to congressional candidates rises in the presidential
election cycles of 2008 and 2012 and recedes in the midterm election cycles of 2006 and 2010,
the number of habitual donors providing support to House candidates increased from 22,851 to
over 30,000 in 2010 and 2012 (see Table 5). Additionally, the number of House candidates
receiving support from Republican Party donors is rising (see Table 6). In sum, the trends
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uncovered in the descriptive data as well as the SEM analysis suggest that party donors are more
likely to provide support to House candidates overtime. Part of the reason for this trend might be
that the donors contributing to House candidates are not the parties’ highest dollar contributors.
The average amount in total funds a Democratic Party donor, who was also supporting one or
more House candidates, contributed to one or more of the Democratic Party committees was
$4,630 in 2006, $8,467 in 2008, $3,458 in 2010, and $1,301 in 2012. For Republicans donors,
the total contributions to one or more of the party committees averaged $4,274 in 2006, $4,856
in 2008, $3,399 in 2010, and $2,378 in 2012 for the donors who were also making contributions
to House candidates. Thus, while the party donors who extend support to House candidates are
not typically small dollar donors, they are also not necessarily high rollers either given that the
maximum a donor could give to a single party committee ranged from $26,700 in 2006 to
$30,800 in 2012.
Support from party donors may become even more important in future election cycles
due to growing competition from interest groups that can easily outraise and outspend
congressional campaigns and parties. In 2010, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United
(558 U.S. 310, 2010) made Super PACs and 501c organizations legal options for donors who
wished to make unlimited contributions (Smith and Powell, 2013). Contributions from 501c
groups are not reported to the Federal Election Commission and individual donors’ names are
not provided on reports to the Internal Revenue Service. And Super PACs have found ways to
circumvent reporting requirements (Public Citizen, 2013; Marziani, 2012). As a consequence,
these contributions are not part of the totals used in this analysis. However, they could account
for the dramatic decrease in the direct effects for party giving on the likelihood of interest group
giving between the 2010 and 2012 election cycles (see Table 2). New applications for status as
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501(c) social welfare organizations rose from 1,751 in 2009 to 3,357 in 2012 (Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration, 2013). Similarly, applications for 501(c)5 labor and agricultural
organizations rose from 543 to 1,081 and for 501(c)6 professional associations from 1,828 to
2,338 (Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, 2013). Additionally, U.S. Federal
Election Commission reports indicate that the number of registered Super PACs grew from 83 in
2010 to 1,262 in 2012.
While it is not clear whether donors chose to give to Super PACs and 501cs instead of
parties or candidates, it is one plausible explanation since donors have been quick to take
advantage of these options. Between 2008 and 2010, anonymous donations more than doubled
(Maguire, 2012) and they increased tenfold between 2010 and 2014 (Kroll, 2014). Thus, there is
reason to believe these groups may constitute a new source of fundraising competition for both
the parties and for candidate campaigns. Fortunately, another recent change in campaign finance
law may help the party committees raise more money for their own coffers as well as those of
candidates. In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (U.S. Supreme Court Docket No.
12-536, 2012, 2) the Court overturned the global cap representing the total legal amount an
individual donor can contribute in hard money to federal candidates, PACs, and parties in a
single election cycle (the cap was $123,200 in 2012). This means from a single contributor the
parties can solicit the maximum contribution allowable (see Data and Method Section) to each of
the three national party committees and then request additional funds at the legal limits for each
of its 50 state parties, and all of its congressional candidates at the legal limit of $2,500 per
candidate per election (Cillizza, 2014). Given rising competition from a wide variety of interest
groups and the Court’s ruling in McCutcheon, the parties may find it profitable to focus their
efforts on the retention of habitual donors. The results of this study suggest these donors already
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give in ways that support party seat maximization goals and have done so over an extended
period of time. Their loyalty is an asset to the parties that should not be squandered.
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Notes
1. In 2006, an individual donor could give a maximum of $2,000 to each candidate per election
and $25,000 to a national party committee per year (U.S. FEC 2006). In 2012, an individual
donor could give a maximum of $2,500 to each candidate per election and $30,800 to a
national party committee per calendar year (U.S. FEC 2012).
2. McCutcheon v. FEC (2014) overturned the global contribution caps for individuals.
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Table 1: Predicting Party Donors' Contributions to House Candidates and
Interest Groups 2006-2008
FIRST-TIME
HABITUAL
DONORS
DONORS
Goodness of Fit
DEM
GOP
DEM
GOP
SRMR
0.041
0.022
0.041
0.022
Coefficient of Determination
0.371
0.219
0.578
0.421
Direct Effects
Pty06-->Experienced06
0.037*** 0.006*** 0.065*** 0.014***
Pty06-->Vulnerable06
0.017*** 0.065*** 0.018*** 0.076***
Pty08-->Experienced08
0.012**
0.007**
-0.008
0.009***
Pty08-->Vulnerable08
0.012*** 0.013*** 0.01***
0.015*
Pty06-->Interest Groups06
0.145*** 0.081*** 0.229*** 0.292*
Pty08-->Interest Groups08
0.130*** 0.075
0.162*** 0.163***
Total Effects
Pty06--> Experienced08
0.024*** 0.012**
0.138
0.018***
Pty06-->Vulnerable08
0.026*** 0.015*** 0.024*** 0.035***
Pty06-->Interest Groups08
0.139*** 0.086**
0.192*** 0.162***
Number of Observations
61,479
109,422
53,635
86,735
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Pty = party donor’s total contributions to the party committees
in corresponding election cycle; Vulnerable = total contributions by party donor to vulnerable incumbents
in corresponding election cycle; Experienced = total contributions by party donor to experienced non-incumbents
in corresponding election cycle; Interest groups= total contributions by party donors to all interest groups in
corresponding election cycle.

27

Table 2: Predicting Party Donors' Contributions to House Candidates and
Interest Groups 2010-2012
FIRST-TIME
HABITUAL
DONORS
DONORS
Goodness of Fit
DEM
GOP
DEM
GOP
SRMR
0.027
0.024
0.054
0.012
Coefficient of Determination
0.873
0.815
0.787
0.312
Direct Effects
Pty10-->Experienced10
-0.008
-0.044** -0.004
0.087**
Pty10-->Vulnerable10
-0.110*** -0.011** -0.003
0.006***
Pty12-->Experienced12
0.005
-0.009
0.020*** 0.010**
Pty12->Vulnerable12
0.005
0.107** 0.013*** 0.088*
Pty10-->Interest Groups10
1.141*** 1.249*** 1.333*** 2.085***
Pty12-->Interest Groups12
0.007
0.054*
-0.008
0.014
Total Effects
Pty10--> Experienced12
0.014*** 0.014*** 0.031*** 0.02***
Pty10-->Vulnerable12
0.006**
0.037*** 0.021*** 0.034***
Pty10-->Interest Groups12
0.016**
0.038*** 0.072** 0.322
Number of Observations
92,291
66,304
118,041 191,372
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Pty = party donor’s total contributions to the party committees
in corresponding election cycle; Vulnerable = total contributions by party donor to vulnerable incumbents
in corresponding election cycle; Experienced = total contributions by party donor to experienced non-incumbents
in corresponding election cycle; Interest groups = total contributions by party donors to all interest groups in
corresponding election cycle.
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Table 3: Predicting Non-Party Donors’
Contributions to House Candidates 2006-2008
Goodness of Fit
SRMR
0.033
Coefficient of Determination
0.013
Direct Effects
IG06-->Experienced06
0.013***
IG06-->Vulnerable06
0.011***
IG08-->Experienced08
0.001
IG08-->Vulnerable08
-0.0003
Total Effects
IG06--> Experienced08
0.008*
IG06-->Vulnerable08
-0.004
IG06-->Interest Groups08
0.312*
Number of Observations
967,288
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; IG = donor’s total contributions
to all interest groups in corresponding election cycle; Vulnerable = total
contributions by donor to vulnerable incumbents in corresponding
election cycle; Experienced = total contributions by donor to
experienced non-incumbents in corresponding election cycle
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Table 4: Predicting Non-Party Donors
Contributions to House Candidates 2010-2012
Goodness of Fit
SRMR
0.047
Coefficient of Determination
0.02
Direct Effects
IG10-->Experienced10
0.006*
IG10-->Vulnerable10
0.001
IG12-->Experienced12
-0.01
IG12->Vulnerable12
-0.256***
Total Effects
IG10--> Experienced12
0.001
IG10-->Vulnerable12
-0.256
IG10-->Interest Groups12
0.376
Number of Observations
965,273
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; IG = donor’s total contributions
to all interest groups in the corresponding election cycle; Vulnerable =
total contributions by donor to vulnerable incumbents in corresponding
election cycle; Experienced = total contributions by donor to
experienced non-incumbents in corresponding election cycle.
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Table 5: Number of Party Donors by Type Who Made Contributions to House Candidates in Targeted Races, All
Congressional Races, and No Congressional Races
2006
2008
2010
2012
Targeted
Any
Targeted
Any
Targeted
Any
Targeted
Any
Race
Race
Race
Race
Race
Race
Race
Race
DEMOCRATS
Habitual
11,214
25,660
9,557
27,201
16,786
35,240
22,238
40,327
First-time
3,511
8,019
1,818
6,062
6,321
13,310
8,566
15,375
# Party Donors That
Did Not Support
House Candidates
89,071
105,534
123,475
74,968
REPUBLICAN
Habitual
8,269
22,851
9,973
26,343
8,695
32,248
10,847
30,311
First-time
1,966
5,930
5,228
15,213
1,835
6,596
477
1,550
# Party Donors That
Did Not Support
House Candidates
168,595
476,482
118,056
38,376
Note: Habitual donors gave in at least two election cycles.
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Table 6: The Impact of Party Donors on House Campaign Fundraising
DEMOCRATS
2006
2008
Number of House Candidates Supported
1,036
1,104
All House Candidates
$103,238 $125,187
Vulnerable Incumbents
$200,751 $270,200
Experienced Challengers
$131,798 $143,990
Experienced Open Seat Candidates
$209,467 $365,926
REPUBLICANS
2006
2008
Number of House Candidates Supported
1,002
1,123
All House Candidates
$101,012
$98,498
Vulnerable Incumbents
$465,402 $351,769
Experienced Challengers
$39,249
$93,770
Experienced Open Seat Candidates
$210,817 $144,611

2010
1,210
$118,195
$535,245
$60,470
$169,786
2010
1,497
$107,472
$109,378
$197,407
$228,524

2012
1,233
$137,090
$274,559
$208,633
$196,018
2012
1,308
$141,740
$416,516
$101,199
$179,744

Note: Average total contributions collectively raised from party donors shown ($)
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On-line Appendix

Figure 1: Democratic First-time Donors 2006 and 2008
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Figure 2: Republican First-time Donors 2006 and 2008
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Figure 3: Democratic Habitual Donors 2006 and 2008
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Figure 4: Republican Habitual Donors 2006 and 2008
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Figure 5: Democratic First-time Donors 2010 and 2012
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Figure 6: Republican First-time Donors 2010 and 2012
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Figure 7: Democratic Habitual Donors 2010 and 2012
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Figure 8: Republican Habitual Donors 2010 and 2012
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Figure 9: Non-Party Donors 2006 and 2008
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Figure 10: Non-Party Donors 2010 and 2012
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